Aftermath of a security scare
There is a reason we do not often follow big news stories here at the Big Bad Blog: they develop. Our team of one (sometimes two, even more rarely three) simply cannot stay on top of the story. There are too many other things that are distracting. News organisations that presumably have some sort of revenue stream tend to do a much better job.
However, when the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) in the United States reacted to a terrorist on a plane on Christmas, many people were on holiday — reaction was muted. And here on the Big Bad Blog, we wrote about it.
Since then, many others have written about it, and the story has (indeed) developed. We are happy to say that we have yet to read an opinion that would seem to indicate support for the latest TSA changes. Everybody seems to believe that they will merely inconvenience passengers without improving their safety.
A (non-comprehensive) summary of things to read, for those who wish to follow the story further:
In the immediate aftermath of the attack, CNN asked the (rhetorical question): Is aviation security mostly for show? Gizmodo asked President Obama to fire the TSA.
The best line from any of the articles covering the attack and changes to security comes from Maureen Dowd of The New York Times:
If we can’t catch a Nigerian with a powerful explosive powder in his oddly feminine-looking underpants and a syringe full of acid, a man whose own father had alerted the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria, a traveler whose ticket was paid for in cash and who didn’t check bags, whose visa renewal had been denied by the British, who had studied Arabic in Al Qaeda sanctuary Yemen, whose name was on a counterterrorism watch list, who can we catch?
Following the dispersal of new security measures, they were (of course) leaked onto the Internet. In a stunning show of efficiency, the TSA tracked down the bloggers who published the information, seeking the source of the leak. If only they could find bomb-carrying terrorists with such efficient determination.
Or maybe not so efficient. The agent they sent out then lost his notebook, which contained details of the investigation into the security breach at the agency. And the TSA decided to drop all legal action against the bloggers they threatened following the (unexpected?) bad press and some fighting back by the bloggers themselves.
One of the bloggers is interviewed here.
And the TSA screening manual is available online (as a PDF) here. They posted it online accidentally, so a news agency picked it up. Naturally.
For those wondering why Israeli airports do not have the same kind of security issues, you are not alone. The Toronto Star wondered why and decided to find out. It would seem that they focus their search on terrorists, rather than “dangerous” substances. Which makes sense — substances are only dangerous if used dangerously.
Most recently, the TSA has now decided that passengers from fourteen countries will have to suffer through “enhanced screening”. (CNN, New York Times)
If you read that last paragraph, and compare it to the Toronto Star article, you can see the disconnect is still there. The TSA is still approaching it wrong — trying to throw a blanket over anybody who might be flying from or hold a passport from places such as Saudi Arabia. Anybody under that blanket has their possessions searched thoroughly.
Terrorists are individuals, not nationalities. Security should be watching for individuals.
Terrorists are humans, and can be creative. Security at airports should not simply be watching for what they believe to be the latest terrorist trend. Chances are, it will be something new. So do not worry too much about their water, their shoes, or the last hour of a flight. Pay attention to the person.
The only constant in these attempts has been what the person is trying to do.
(Photo by Thomas Cain/Wired.com)
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